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Banister: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR INS
CHURCH-BUSTERS?
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) v.
UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION

In The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States,! the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding that the doctrine
of "qualified immunity"2 protected individual agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from damages
claims for constitutional violations. 8 The plaintiff churches· had
sued the agents for damages and sought to enjoin the govern1. 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Norris, J; the other panel members were Kozinski, J., and Leavy, J.).
2. The concept of qualified immunity, also known by its older name of "good faith
immunity", shields from civil damages liability those government officials who perform
discretionary functions, as long as "their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (President Nixon's aides qualifiedly immune from damages suit by discharged Air Force employee). The Supreme Court recently refined the concept by stating: "The contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right. This is not to say that an official is protected by qualified immunity unless the
very action in question has previously been held unlawful, ... but it is to say that in the
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." Presbyterian Church, 870
F.2d at 527 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (FBI agent who
searched home in violation of fourth amendment qualifiedly immune from damages suit
if he could reasonably have believed search was legal)).
3. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 528.
4. Three of the plaintiffs were in Phoenix: Alzona Evangelical Lutheran Church,
Camelback United Presbyterian Church and Sunrise United Presbyterian Church. The
fourth plaintiff, Southside United Presbyterian Church, was located in Tucson. The two
national parent denominations, The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and the American Lutheran Church, were also plaintiffs. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520.
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ment entities from covert surveillance of church activities,ci
claiming that the surveillance violated the churches' first and
fourth amendment rights.8 Because of its dismissal of the damages claims against the agents, 7 the court remanded for a determination as to whether standing and mootness obstacles might
compel dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief
against the defendant government entities. 8 This note will focus
on the court's holding that the individual agents are qualifiedly
immune from damages suits based on the churches' claim that
their right to the free exercise of religion under the first amendment was violated. 9
II. FACTS
Between March 1984 and January 1985, the INS conducted
a covert surveillance program aimed at four Arizona churches 10
whose members and leaders allegedly were participants in the
so-called "sanctuary movement".l1 The surveillance at issue in
Presbyterian Church involved sending INS agents into
churches. 12 The agents infiltrated church activities posing as ordinary citizens, and surreptitiously made tape recordings of numerous church services and Bible study classes. 13 The investigations were conducted without search warrants and without
probable cause to believe that the surveillance of the churches
would uncover evidence of criminal activity.14 The surveillance
became a matter of public record during the prosecution of several members of the movement. lIi Subsequently, the churches
5. [d. at 521.

6. [d.
7. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 528.
8. [d. at 529.
9. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 521.
10. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520. See
supra note 4.
11. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. The movement was a widespread group
of clergy and lay people who provided assistance and shelter in private homes and religious buildings to Central American refugees who had entered the country illegally. See
generally 1. BAU. THIS GROUND IS HOLY 75-76 (1985) (hereinafter BAU).
12. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. See also United States v. Aguilar, 871
F.2d 1436, 1470 (9th Cir. 1989) (criminal prosecution of sanctuary workers, during which
proceedings INS revealed it had placed informants among sanctuary workers).
13. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520.
14. [d.
15. [d.
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brought this suit. 16
In the district court, the churches alleged that defendants
abridged their first amendment rights of free exercise of religion,
free speech and free association.17 In addition, they alleged that
the warrantless surveillance constituted an illegal search under
the fourth amendment. 1s Finally, the churches alleged that when
their congregations learned of the surveillance, the churches suffered actual injuries. 19
The churches sought nominal damages against the individual INS agents,20 a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief
prohibiting the INS from engaging in such surveillance in the
future, absent a "prior established and compelling governmental
interest."21 The district court ruled that the churches lacked
first amendment standing,22 that they had failed to state a
fourth amendment claim,23 that the individual agents were entitled to qualified immunity from suit on the damages claim,24 and
that the government entities were protected by sovereign immunity against the claims for equitable and monetary relief.211
16. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520.
17. [d. On appeal, the sole first amendment issue was apparently the free exercise
claim. The court limited its discussion to that claim, and made no further mention of the
"freedom of belief, speech and association" claims. [d. at 520-527.

18. [d. at 521.
19. [d. at 521-22. The injuries included: withdrawal of church members from active
participation; cancellation of a Bible study group for lack of participation; diversion of
clergy time from regular pastoral duties; decline in monetary support by the membership
and the community; reluctance by congregants to seek pastoral counseling; and less
openness among the congregants in prayers and confessions. [d.

20. [d.

21. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 521-22.
22. [d. The district court reasoned that the first amendment protects only individuals, not corporations, because "churches don't go to heaven." Quoted in Presbyterian
Church, 870 F.2d at 521.
23. [d.

24. [d.
25. [d. at 524-25. The common law governmental defense of sovereign immunity is
codified in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). This section waives
the defense (under certain circumstances) against equitable relief, but not against lawsuits for money damages. The district court agreed with the INS that the agency's investigation of the churches was not an "agency action" within the meaning of section 702,
but the Ninth Circuit reversed on this point. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 524-25.
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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

The purpose of the doctrine of qualified immunity, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald 28 is to
shield innocent public officials from insubstantial lawsuits. 27
Qualified immunity analysis focuses on whether a reasonable
government official should have known that his or her actions
were violative of a person's constitutional or statutory rights. 28
The reasonableness of the official's actions depends on how
"clearly established" those rights are. 2S
The Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton 30 described
the analysis in more detail. The Court first observed that under
Harlow, whether an official should be held qualifiedly immune
for an allegedly unlawful action "turns on the 'objective legal
reasonableness' of the action ... assessed in light of the legal
rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken."31
The Court noted that the operation of this standard depends
substantially upon the "level of generality" at which the relevant
"legal rule" is to be identified. 32 For example, the Court noted
that there are many constitutional and statutory rights which
can be said to be "clearly established" in the general sense, such
26. 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
27. [d. The Court explained the purpose as follows:
In situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may
offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees. [citations omitted]. It is this recognition that has
required the denial of absolute immunity to most public officers. At the same time, however, it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well
as the guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but
to society as a whole. [footnote omitted].
In identifying qualified immunity as the best attainable
accommodation of competing values ... we relied on the assumption that this standard would permit "[i]nsubstantial
lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated."
[d.

28. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
29. [d.

30. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
31. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
32. Anderson. 483 U.S. at 639.
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as the fourteenth amendment right to due process of law,33 and
the fourth amendment right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 34 But in order to overcome the defense of
qualified immunity, plaintiffs must do more than merely allege
violations of such "extremely abstract rights."36
In Anderson, an FBI agent without a warrant had searched
a house, erroneously believing that the search was supported by
probable cause and exigent circumstances. 36 The plaintiffs argued that the agent was not entitled to qualified immunity, because the fugitive who was the object of the search was not present at the house, making the search therefore "unreasonable"
and a violation of the fourth amendment. 37 The Court rejected
this argument, pointing out that plaintiffs were in essence asserting that an agent's ultimately erroneous search could not be
"reasonably unreasonable" for qualified immunity purposes. 38
The Court observed that the plaintiffs' position would create a
"rule of virtually unqualified liability."39 The Court remanded
the case to the district court for a determination of whether the
actions allegedly taken by the FBI agent were actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful; that is, whether it was
reasonable for him to believe he had probable cause and exigent
circumstances to search the house. 4o
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the defense
of qualified immunity is to be decided at the earliest possible
stage in the litigation. 41 The "earliest possible stage" is not necessarily at the summary judgment stage; it may be later, as the
Court in Anderson observed. 42 A defense of qualified immunity
can even be presented and resolved at the end of atrial. 43 An
33.Id.
34. Id. at 640.
35. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
36. Id. at 637.
37. Id. at 643.
38. Id. at 643.
39. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
40. Id. at 646 n. 6; 640·41.
41. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (U.S.
Attorney General entitled to qualified immunity from suit over wiretaps which violated
fourth amendment, since illegality was not clearly established as of time of wiretaps);
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6.
42. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6.
43. See, e.g., Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 274·75 (7th Cir.) (state official's fail·
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important reason for denying a defendant qualified immunity at
the summary judgment stage is the necessity for resolution of
material factual issues bearing on the question of the reasonableness of a defendant official's actions."
The Supreme Court has not definitively prescribed the
source of law from which a court is to determine whether a right
is clearly established. In Harlow, the Supreme Court declined
for the second time U to decide whether the clearly-established
nature of'a particular right should be evaluated solely by reference to the opinions of the Supreme Court, or should also refer
to the appellate and district courts.'s At least one pre-Harlow
case'7 held that the inquiry was to include Supreme Court opinure to move for directed verdict at close of all evidence did not foreclose inclusion of
qualified immunity defense in motion for JNOV), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 n.6. See also Roth v. Veteran's Administration, 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988). In Roth, a "whistleblower" physician's first amendment claim against Veteran's Administration officials was found to involve a material
factual dispute as to the extent of office disruption caused by the physician's
whistleblowing activities. [d. at 1408. The defendant government officials nonetheless argued that they should be granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. [d.
The court summarized their argument as follows:
They contend that because we must balance competing interests in deciding whether office disruption outweighs protected
speech, and because this balancing process is fact-specific,
public officials cannot be expected to predict the outcome of
such balancing or engage in it themselves.
[d.

The court in Roth conceded that the Seventh Circuit in Benson, 786 F.2d at 276,
adopted this position. But the court in Roth rejected this logic as inapposite at the summary judgment stage, observing that the qualified immunity defense in Benson had been
presented after full development of the relevant facts at a trial. Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408.
The court instead held that the need to conduct such fact-based balancing precluded a
grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. [d.
45. [d. at 818 n.32. The first time the Court declined to define what "clearly established" means was in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978) (state prison officials held qualifiedly immune from suit over alleged negligent interference with prisoner's outgoing mail).
46. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals twice referred,
in 1983 and 1984, to this lack of Supreme Court guidance. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (police and FBI agents not qualifiedly immune from damages for violating peace groups' first amendment rights, despite no Supreme Court holding on particular facts of this case); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 168-69 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (former U.S. Attorney General qualifiedly immune from damages suit, as there
existed no clearly established warrant requirement for national security wiretaps).
47. Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980) (police officers who conducted
illegal search in good faith reliance on department policies not liable for damages because no clearly established law existed), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 969 (1981).
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ions, those of the "appropriate" court of appeals,48 and the highest state court.49
The Ninth Circuit in Bilbrey v. Brown50 defined the doctrine as involving more than merely looking for a binding precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court.51 In Capoeman v. Reed,52
the court expanded the scope of inquiry into the question of
whether a law is clearly established. 58 The court observed that in
the absence of binding precedent, a court should look to
"whatever decisional law is available" to ascertain whether the
law is clearly established. 54 The court in Capoeman expressly
noted that inquiry was broader than merely looking at decisions
of the Supreme Court, the state's highest court and the "appropriate" circuit court. 55 That court also reviewed decisions of
lower state courts, other circuits, and district courts. 56
The Capoeman principles were applied by the Ninth Circuit
in subsequent decisions. 57 This trend has continued, with the
most recent Ninth Circuit decisions surveying every circuit to
find opinions that shed light on the clearly established nature of
the right allegedly violated. &8
48. [d at 1161.
49. [d.

50. 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (students had clearly-established fourth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches by school officials).
51. [d. at 1466. In Bilbrey, the court, finding no explicit rulings by the Supreme
Court or the Ninth Circuit, found that the officials had constructive notice of decisions of
state courts, other circuits and various district courts. [d.
52. 754 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1985) (prison officials immune from liability for cutting
prisoner's hair allegedly in violation of first amendment free exercise rights).
53. [d. at 1514.
54. [d.
55. [d. The court noted that it was adopting a broader inquiry than that employed
by the Fourth Circuit in Wallace, which did not consider the opinions of other circuits or
of district courts. Wallace, 626 F.2d at 1161.
56. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1514.
57. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 1988) (prison official
on notice that manner of digital rectal searches was unconstitutional); Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988) (law clearly established that state trooper
could not abandon passenger of impounded car in high-crime neighborhood); Ward v.
County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1986) (sheriff on notice of clearly
established law that pre-hearing jail detainees cannot be strip searched absent probable
cause, despite contrary state superior court opinion), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987).
58. See Vaughan, 859 F.2d at 739. The court surveyed the law on "reasonable" strip
searches in all circuits, noting that by 1984 (the year plaintiff was strip searched) the
majority of the circuits had considered the question. The court specifically found that, in
addition to the Supreme Court, eight circuits had dealt with the issue. [d.
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The Capoeman opinion also employed a specific procedure
for determining whether defendant government officials could be
charged with constructive knowledge of the law in a particular
area, even though there were few Ninth Circuit cases involving
the same factual scenario. The court in Capoeman concluded
that when there are relatively few cases on point, and none of
them are binding, courts in this circuit may determine whether
the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit would have reached the
same conclusion as those other courts. liB That determination
consists of evaluating the way those non-binding decisions applied related legal issues to factually different situations, and
comparing those legal applications to the analyses being used by
the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit at the same time. 60 To
make its determination of how clearly established the law was,
the court in Capoeman examined how other circuit and district
courts analyzed prisoners' allegations of first amendment free
exercise violations by prison regulations. 61 Not only did the
court consider cases involving prison hair-length regulations (the
situation in Capoeman), but it also examined a variety of other
religious freedom issues in prisons. 62 The court concluded that,
while a variety of standards were employed by courts, most of
the non-binding decisions applied the "less restrictive means"
test to those alleged first amendment violations. 63
The court then compared the non-binding decisions to the
analyses used in cases before the Ninth Circuit6• and the Supreme Court,611 neither of which was factually identical to the
See also, Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1989) (supervisors of civil service employee immune from suit because of conflict in other circuits' opinions and lack of precedent in Ninth Circuit). In Lum, the court devoted three pages of its opinion to a survey
of the decisional law. The court carefully considered the holdings, analyses and facts in
cases from eleven circuits and the Supreme Court. Id at 1387-89.
59. [d. Examples of non-binding decisions would be those of other circuits, state
courts, and those of another federal district. [d. at 1414.
60. [d. Accord Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d at 1332; Lum v. Jensen, 876
F.2d at 1387.
61. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1515.
62. [d. Some examples are: beards worn by prisoners of various faiths; name
changes; body searches of male prisoners by female guards; use of the prison chapel by
prisoners of non-mainstream faiths. [d.
63. [d.
64. Jones v. Bradley, 590 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1979) (prison had legitimate reasons for
restrictions on chapel use).
65. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (Buddhist prisoner entitled to reasonable opportunity to pursue faith comparable to that of prisoners of conventional faiths).
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situation involved in Capoeman. 66 The court found that prior to
the time the plaintiff's hair was cut pursuant to the prison regulations, it was not clear which standard the Ninth Circuit would
have used to evaluate prison regulations. 67 Prison officials might
have reasonably believed that their hair-length regulation was
an "appropriate restriction", or that it needed only a "rational
basis", or that prison officials needed only to balance a "legitimate interest" in prison security against prisoners' constitutional rights in order to promulgate such a regulation. 68 Because
of the welter of conflicting standards and tests employed to evaluate alleged violations of prisoners' first amendment rights, and
in the absence of a clear indication that the Ninth Circuit or the
Supreme Court would have adopted the "less restrictive means"
standard employed by the majority of other circuits, the court in
Capoeman found that the law was not clearly established in this
circuit. 69 Therefore, prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity, because they could not be charged with the knowledge
that they had to make a prior determination that cutting prisoners' hair was the least restrictive means of accomplishing the
prison's interests. 7o
A more recent Ninth Circuit application of the Capoeman
procedure was seen in Wood v. Ostrander. 71 The question in Ostrander was whether a person who suffered harm as a result of
being placed in danger by a police officer in the course of his
official duty could prevail over a qualified immunity defense. 72
The court acknowledged that it had not found a binding precedent from either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit. 73 The
66. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1514-15.
67. [d.
68. [d. at 1515.
69. Capoeman, 754 F.2d at 1515-16.
70. [d. at 1516.
71. 851 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1988). The plaintiff in Ostrander sought damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state trooper for allegedly leaving a woman alone in a highcrime area aft~r impounding her car in the middle of the night. [d. at 1213. The trooper
had pulled the car over at 2:30 a.m. because its high beams were on. Determining that
the driver was drunk, the officer arrested him and called for a tow truck to have the car
impounded. [d. The woman passenger claimed she was not offered a ride home or any
other help in leaving the high-crime area. After walking some distance in 50-degree
weather wearing only a blouse and jeans, she accepted a ride with an unknown man, who
then drove her to a secluded area and raped her. [d.
72. [d. at 1218.
73. [d. at 1218.
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court observed that the law for the Seventh Circuit was clearly
established by the holding in White v. Rochford,7' but whether
that case established the law for the Ninth Circuit was a close
question. 7 !! In order to answer that question, the court in Ostrander recalled 76 the procedure applied in Capoeman. 77
The opinion in Ostrander analyzed a 1986 Ninth Circuit
case, Escamilla v. Santa Ana,78 observing that the court there
had relied primarily on pre-1984 cases. 79 In Escamilla, a bystander was unintentionally killed by brawlers in a barroom.
The bystander's children sued the undercover officer present, on
the theory that he had negligently failed to prevent the killing.80
The court concluded that those facts gave rise to no liability,
because the law imposed no duty to protect the bystander absent a "special relationship" between the bystander and the police officer. 81
The Ostrander opinion then reviewed the analysis of Escamilla in light of the analysis in Rochford,82 observing that
both the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit required a special relationship to exist between a police officer and a bystander
before liability could arise. 83 The court reasoned that although
the conclusion in Escamilla was not binding (because of the
finding of no special relationship), the declaration of the applicable legal rule for the Ninth Circuit was binding." The connection of this legal rule with the sufficiently on-point fact pattern
in Rochford required that the defendant officer in Ostrander be
charged with constructive knowledge that the presence of his
74. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (police liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for recklessly
endangering three young children stranded in a car on a busy eight-lane freeway upon
the arrest of their uncle for drag-racing the car).
75. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218.
76. [d.
77. 754 F.2d at 1515.
78. 796 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1986) (police officer not liable for bystander's death in
barroom brawl because no custodial or other special relationship existed).
79. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218 (citing Escamilla, 796 F.2d at 268-9). The Escamilla opinion's reliance on pre-1984 cases was significant to the court in Ostrander
because the cases predated the events in Ostrander. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218.
80. Escamilla, 796 F.2d at 267.
81. [d. at 270.
82. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218-19.
83. [d.
84. [d. at 1218.
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special relationship to the woman he abandoned would give rise
to liability.81i Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a
qualified immunity defense. 8s
The case being decided need not be factually identical to a
prior case in order for a court to conclude that the prior case
clearly establishes the law. 87 To require strict factual similarity
would operate to perpetually immunize government actors from
suit. 88 The Supreme Court has cautioned courts not to take a
too-restrictive view of the factual similarities necessary to find
that a right is clearly established. 89 The Ninth Circuit has
adopted this reasoning,90 rejecting arguments that a "case can be
disposed of if it does not bear a strict factual similarity to previous cases finding liability."91 Such an argument is a "crabbed
view of the good faith immunity principle [which] cannot withstand analysis. "92
85. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1218.
86. [d. at 1220.
87. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1217. The court found that" the key similarities between

the case at bar and the prior case were: the level of danger to which the plaintiffs were
exposed, id.; the officer's deliberate indifference to that danger, id. at 1217-18; and the
fact that the endangerment was the result of the performance of official duty, id. at 1218.
The factual dissimilarities, such as the differences in age, location and the potential
harm, did not entitle the defendant to immunity. [d. The court observed: "It defies common sense to find a meaningful legal distinction between the dangers facing children
crossing a busy highway and a woman left alone to fend for herself at 2:30 a.m. in a highcrime area." [d.
88. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Court in Hobson put it this
way:
In such circumstances, to require a prior Supreme Court holding on the particular facts of this case would not only immunize but actually reward the Government for inventing and
pursuing ever more egregious conduct. Indeed, there never
could be such a ruling from the Court, because Harlow would
always immunize the Government actors.
[d. at 29 (emphasis added).
89. See Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 535 n. 12; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The
Supreme Court in Anderson rejected the need for strict factual similarity, observing that
officials are not always immune from liability or suit merely because the challenged action was not held previously, under identical circumstances, to have been unconstitutional. [d.
90. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1217. The court specifically relied on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Anderson and Forsyth for the analysis of the degree of factual similarity needed to overcome qualified immunity. [d.
91. [d. The court was referring to the defendants' arguments, which were relied on
by the district court. [d. at 1216, nA.
92. [d at 1217.
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The Ninth Circuit has continued to hold that strict factual
similarity is not required, and has distinguished cases holding
otherwise in other circuits. For example, in Benson v. Allphin,93
the Seventh Circuit expressed its uncertainty as to the precise
manner of determining whether the law was clearly established.
There, a state employee claimed that his first amendment right
to speak out publicly on issues of public concern outweighed his
supervisor's right to take measures to shield from public disclosure an internal investigation of illegal activities by state employees. 9~ The Seventh Circuit noted that a fact-specific balancing
was required to, among other things, determine the extent to
which the supervisor's ability to effectively conduct his investigation was being undermined by the employee's whistle blowing
disclosures. 9G The court observed that the proper balancing of
those factors was a complicated and difficult task even for the
judiciary, and even more so for the defendant public official,96
For that reason, the court reasoned that the facts of the existing
caselaw must closely correspond to the contested action before
the defendant official's qualified immunity defense would be
rejected. 97
Defendants in a Ninth Circuit case, Roth v. Veteran's Administration,98 attempted to make the same argument in another whistle blowing case. The court distinguished Benson on
two grounds. First, the court observed that there are situations
in which the defendants' conduct may be so egregious that particularized balancing of protected first amendment rights against
the need to minimize office disruption will be a foregone conclusion in favor of the plaintiffs, and qualified immunity should be
unavailable to the defendants. 99 The court rejected the defendants' reliance on Benson, observing that acceptance of a broader
reading of Benson would amount to a holding that public employees can never bring an action alleging retaliation for exercise
of first amendment rights because adjudicating these claims re,

93. 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848 (1986).
94. [d. at 271. The specific measures challenged by the employee included his termination by his supervisor. [d.
95. [d. at 276.
96. [d. at 278.
97. Benson, 786 F.2d at 276.
98. 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988).
99. Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408, citing Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 n. 18.
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quires particularized balancing. 100
The court in Roth also distinguished Benson on the ground
that the finding of qualified immunity in Benson came after a
full tria1. 10l The court reasoned that in such a case, there was a
much more fully developed examination of the facts, which
could then be accurately compared to the prior caselaw. l02 The
court therefore declined to find the defendants qualifiedly immune at the summary judgment stage, observing that precisely
because a fact-specific, particularized balancing was required,
there would necessarily be genuine issues of material fact
preventing the grant of summary judgment. loa
B.

RELATED IMMIGRATION LITIGATION

Presbyterian Church arose out of a criminal prosecution of
several individuals involved in the sanctuary movement. 1M Eight
of the convicted defendants appealed the case, United States v.
Aguilar/or. to the Ninth Circuit. In Aguilar, the court noted that
the three primary infiltrators lOS of the sanctuary movement in
the Phoenix/Tucson region had taken part in a number of
church-sponsored illegal activities such as smuggling operations/0 7 delivery of falsified immigration documents/os and interstate transportation of illegal aliens.loe After securing the
100. Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408.
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
102. [d.
103. [d.
104. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 520. See also supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
105. 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989). The court set forth the criminal charges against
the eight appellants in a footnote. [d. at 1441 n.1.
106. The men, Jesus Cruz, John Nixon, and Soloman Graham, were informants for
the INS. [d. at 1443-44. See also BAU, supra note 11, at 85. Two of the Aguilar informants, Jesus Cruz and Soloman Graham, were formerly smugglers employed by American ranchers to transport illegal aliens across the U.S. border. [d. at 85-86. They were
specifically recruited by the INS in Phoenix to infiltrate the sanctuary movement as an
alternative to criminal prosecution. BAU, supra note 11, at 86.
107. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1443. The court observed that the infiltrators had repeatedly taken part in smuggling illegal aliens through an existing hole in the fence constituting the international boundary. [d.
108. [d. One of the informants assisted several defendants obtain and deliver an
immigration document to an illegal alien. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1443.
109. [d. at 1443-44. After the illegal aliens had crossed the border, some were transported to various locations such as New Mexico and California. [d.
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trust of the movement activists, llO the three informants attended high-level secret meetings in the office of the Southside
Church. 111
The factual situation in Aguilar illustrates an INS infiltration program involving a type of surveillance distinct from that
at issue in Presbyterian Church. The criminal defendants in
Aguilar were the focus of fairly prosaic undercover criminal investigative techniques ll2 based on probable cause that crimes
were being committed. ll3 The civil plaintiffs in Presbyterian
Church, on the other hand, were the focus of surreptitious recording of worship services and Bible study classes ll4 by INS
agents llli who had no warrants or probable cause to believe
crimes were being committed. ll8
In both cases there arose the question of whether, in light of
the implication of first amendment rights, the fourth amendment required the government to obtain a warrant in order to
conduct covert surveillance.l17 The Aguilar court rejected the argument, also made to the court in Presbyterian Church, that the
mere presence of first amendment interests invokes the warrant
clause of the fourth amendment. u8 The court held that the
110. Id. at 1444-45.
111. Id. See also BAU, supra note 11, at 85-86. The informants recorded over one
hundred hours of conversations at these meetings. The recordings were transcribed into
40,000 pages of transcript evidence. Id.
112. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1443-45.
113. [d. at 1442. The court described one 80urce of this probable cause: "Appellants
sought and received extensive media coverage of their efforts on behalf of Central American aliens. Eventually, the INS accepted appellants' challenge to investigate their alien
smuggling and harboring activities." The court then provided a detailed account of the
great diversity of movement-initiated media coverage. [d.
114. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Circ.
1989).
115. [d. The court in Presbyterian Church did not name the informants.
116. Id. See also supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
117. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1472-73; Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527. The principal case relied on in each opinion was Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)
(in police search of newspaper office for photographic evidence of a crime, fourth amendment warrant requirement sufficient to protect first amendment rights of newspaper,
such that higher protection of subpoena duces tecum not required). Zurcher held that
the warrant requirement must be applied "with particular exactitude" when first amendment rights might be violated. [d. at 565.
118. See Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1472 n. 36. The court approved of the holding in Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527, that Zurcher was inapposite, but not for exactly the
same reason. The court in Presbyterian Church distinguished Zurcher on its facts. The
court observed that a newspaper office was not generally open to the public, while a
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fourth amendment's other protections are sufficient to safeguard
first amendment rights in the context of an investigation of suspected criminal activity.l19
Another civil case arising out of criminal prosecution of
sanctuary movement workers is American Baptist Churches in
the U.S.A. v. Meese 120 (hereinafter American Baptist Churches
II). The plaintiff churches asserted a first amendment free exercise right to harbor Central American refugees as a matter of
religious faith. 121 The government prosecuted them under the
same criminal harboring and transporting statute at issue in
Aguilar. 122 The plaintiffs in American Baptist Churches II unchurch worship service was. Therefore, the plaintiff churches had no reasonable expecta·
tion of privacy. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527.
The court in Aguilar, however, went further, and noted that even though Zurcher
required a warrant to conduct a search when there were first amendment rights involved,
the "invited informer" doctrine obviated the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1473. The court's implied rationale for this conclusion is apparently
that reasonable law enforcement officials could suspect that criminal activities were taking place even in the worship services themselves. Id. at 1472 n. 37.
In Presbyterian Church, the court did not (and could not) rely on this rationale.
The court acknowledged that the INS had no probable cause to suspect that criminal
activities were taking place in the worship services themselves. 870 F.2d at 520. Therefore, the "invited informer" rationale was not available to the court in Presbyterian
Church.
119. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1471-73. The court observed that there are numerous cases
holding that the fourth amendment does not protect from the "invited informer" the
privacy rights of individuals suspected of being involved in criminal activities, because
"legitimate law enforcement interests require persons to take the risk that those with
whom they associate may be government agents." Id. at 1472.
The opinion seemed to extend the "invited informer" doctrine significantly when it
apparently approved of the covert surveillance of the worship services themselves. The
court noted approvingly that the agents did not "actively disrupt" the worship activities,
and that "[t]heir monitoring was surreptitious .... " Id. at 1472 n.37. Nowhere in the
facts of Aguilar was there any discussion of the grounds for suspicion that illegal activities were taking place in the worship services. Rather, the facts all centered on the illegal
planning going on in the private meetings held by the sanctuary movement workers. Id.
at 1441-45.
120. 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (religious sanctuary workers unsuccessfully
sought injunction against prosecution for smuggling and harboring Central American refugees). Also relevant to this discussion are earlier proceedings, which culminated in a
reported decision. See American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 666 F. Supp.
1358 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (plaintiffs had conditional standing to assert first amendment
claim).
121. American Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 759.
122. Id. The statute is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, PUB.L. No.
99-603, § 112, 100 STAT. 3381 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (1989)). The relevant portions of that section concern, in essence, illegally bringing aliens into the country, transporting them within the country, and harboring them from detection. See also
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successfully challenged the very prosecution itself,123 as a violation of their first amendment free exercise right to provide sanctuary to refugees.
The court in an earlier proceeding (hereinafter American
Baptist Churches 1),124 held that the plaintiff religious organizations had standing to assert the first amendment claim.l2Ii In addition, the court held that they had stated a valid first amendment cause of action,126 for either of two reasons. First, the
plaintiffs may have been able to prove at trial that they were
entitled to an exemption from the INS' enforcement of the applicable statute. 127 Or second, they may have been able to prove
that the government had prosecuted religious sanctuary workers
in bad faith for th~ sole purpose of harassing them. 128
The court in American Baptist Churches [129 set forth the
test used by the Ninth Circuit for analyzing alleged government
intrusions on first amendment free exercise rights. ISO The court
found that the plaintiffs had alleged the first prong of the test:
Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1446 n.2.
123. American Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 759.
124. 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
125. Id. at 1364. The court found a strong likelihood that the INS would continue to
prosecute sanctuary workers in the future. Id. at 1362. The court based its conclusion on
the history of the INS' prosecution of sanctuary workers (21 cases prosecuted so far,
many of which involved the same religious organizations before the court), as well as the
INS's declared intention of enforcing the statute. Id.
126. Id. at 1366.
127. Id. at 1366, 1360 n.1.
128. 666 F. Supp. at 1366. Although the court in a subsequent proceeding dismissed
the case, the dismissal was not based on the merits of the first amendment claim. American Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 762. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to assert the First Amendment claim, reasoning that the earlier decision only
granted conditional standing to assert the first amendment claim. Id. In support of that
conclusion, the court noted that the plaintiffs had since amended their complaint, and
now requested exemption from prosecutions only under the old version of the statute. Id.
at 761·62. The court accepted the defendants' argument that by virtue of Congress'
amendment of the older criminal harboring and transporting statute with the enactment
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, there was now a significant likeli·
hood that certain of the INS' prosecution goals would be changed; i.e., the INS now
seemed less interested in prosecuting religious organizations, and more interested in
prosecuting employers. Id. at 761 n.1. Therefore, the court reasoned, there was less likelihood of a continuing wrong which would justify the granting of injunctive relief. Id. at
762. The court's alternative ground for dismissal was that the plaintiffs had not made a
prima facie showing of selective (harassing) prosecution. Id. at 762·63.
129. 666 F. Supp. at 1364·66.
130. Id. at 1364·65.
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that the impact of the facially neutral immigration statute on
the sanctuary workers' free exercise right was substantial. 13l As
for the second prong, the court held that the government's interests in secure borders were compelling as a matter of law. 132
With regard to the third prong, the court found that the plaintiffs had alleged that the harm to their first amendment rights
outweighed any harm to the government's interests that might
result from an exemption from prosecution under the statute. 133
The court noted that the extent of such harm to governmental
interests was a factual question incapable of proper resolution
on a motion to dismiss,134 citing a 1984 Ninth Circuit case, Callahan v. Woods. l3Ci
In Callahan, the court had observed that determination of
the existence of a compelling governmental interest does not dispose of the issue in favor of the government; rather, the "least
restrictive means" inquiry is the critical third aspect of the free
exercise analysis. 13s The court in American Baptist Churches I
employed the least restrictive means inquiry endorsed by Callahan in 1984. 137 The court ordered further proceedings to consider whether the INS' compelling objectives would be "mini131. Id. at 1365.
132. American Baptist Churches I, 666 F. Supp. at 1365-66. The court concluded
that "there exists a compelling governmental interest bearing a close proximity and necessity to the criminal harboring statute at issue here." Id. at 1366.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. 736 F.2d 1269, 1274-75. (9th Cir. 1984). In Callahan, a welfare applicant challenged a state requirement to provide a social security number, which the applicant believed was the "mark of the beast". Id. at 1271. The district court had held that the state
had a compelling interest in administrative efficiency that outweighed the applicant's
free exercise burden. Id. at 1272. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had
failed to consider whether the state's compelling interest would be substantially undermined by granting a religious exemption. Id. at 1275. The court termed this a "least
restrictive menns" test, requiring a remand because it was a factual determination. [d.
136. Id. at 1272 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963».
This is the same test used in the free speech and free association contexts. See, e.g.,
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (draft card burning statute's burdening of free speech rights no more restrictive than necessary to protect compelling
governmental purpose); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (statute requiring
teachers to list associational memberships may be based on compelling purpose, but was
not the "least drastic means" of achieving that purpose); White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757,
772 (1975) (covert surveillance of university classrooms allowable only if shown to be the
least intrusive means of protecting compelling governmental interest).
137. American Baptist Churches I, 666 F.Supp. at 1366.
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mally impeded" by the granting of an exemption to the plaintiff
religious organizations. 138 The fact that the plaintiffs in those
subsequent proceedings (American Baptist Churches II) were
found to lack standing,139 was due to an amendment of the
statute. HO

C.

OTHER SURVEILLANCE LITIGATION

In Donohoe v. DulingHl the police carried on covert photographic surveillance of demonstrators' gatherings in various 10cations. 142 Some of the meetings were held inside a church, but
the police did not take photographs of those gatherings. Instead,
they photographed demonstrators entering and leaving the
church. 143
The plaintiff demonstrators alleged violations of their first
amendment rights of speech and association, and of their right
of privacy from unreasonable government intrusion. 144 The
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert
the alleged first amendment violations, because there was no testimony as to any objective harm, deterrent or chilling effect due
to the surveillance. HI! The court noted also that because the police did not actually place photographers inside the church, no
first amendment rights were implicated. 146
In United States v. SCOpO,147 federal agents took surrepti138. Id.
139. American Baptist Churches II, 712 F. Supp. at 762.
140. Id. After passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1986 the INS changed certain practices, which led the court in American Baptist Churches II to conclude that
there was no longer a strong likelihood that such illegal practices would continue in the
future. 756 F. Supp. at 762. See also supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
141. 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (political demonstrators lacked first amendment
standing because they had not alleged any objective harm, restraint or chilling effect due
to police surveillance of public meetings).
142. Id. at 197.
143. Id. at 198-99.
144. Id. at 197.
145. Donohoe, 465 F.2d at 199.
146. Id. at 198. The fact that the church meetings were on private property was a
factor that the police "properly" took into consideration in deciding not photograph inside the church. Although the court observed that the church meetings were also open to
the public, the court did not hold that the police were protected by that fact. Id.
147. 861 F.2d 339 (2nd Cir. 1988) (covert surveillance photos taken of suspected
criminal while outside church not violative of free exercise clause).
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tious photographs of a suspected criminal as he entered and exited a church while attending a funeral. 148 The defendant
claimed that his first amendment rights were violated by the
surveillance.H9 The Second Circuit recognized the potential chilling effect on his exercise of religion, but held there was no first
amendment violation. lII0 The court found that covert surveillance photographs were reasonably related to the government's
compelling interest in investigation of suspected criminals. un
More importantly, the court found those means were not unduly
broad and unnecessarily intrusive,lIi2 observing that the government's covert photographs were not taken inside the church and
did not record any religious ceremony.lIiS
In White v. Davis,llS" undercover police agents allegedly conducted routine covert surveillance of various university classrooms. llSlS The police had no probable cause to believe there was
any criminal activity going on. llSB The plaintiffs alleged that the
covert surveillance violated their first amendment rights of freedom of speech, assembly and privacy.llS7 The California supreme
court held that such covert surveillance constituted a prima facie violation of first amendment rights, and reversed the lower
court's granting of a demurrer.llS8 In a footnote, the court carefully explained its rejection of the defendant police department's
contention that the semi-public nature of a classroom negated
148. [d. at 347. The defendant was reputed to be a member of the Colombo crime
family, and the photos were taken to show him mingling with other known members of
the family. [d.
149. [d.

150. [d. at 347-348.
151. Scopo, 861 F.2d at 348.
152. [d.
153. [d.
154. 13 Ca1.3d 757, 120 Cal.Rptr 94, 533 P.2d 222 (1975) (students and faculty
stated cause of action against police officers conducting covert surveillance of classrooms
without warrants or probable cause to suspect criminal activity).
155. 13 Cal.3d at 760. The complaint alleged that police officers, serving as "secret
informers and undercover agents," registered as students at UCLA, attended classes and
meetings of organizations, and maintained police dossiers containing their reports of
what went on at those meetings. [d. at 762.
156. [d. at 765. Because the case was an appeal from a demurrer, the court ruled
"we must assume that the Los Angeles Police Department is conducting a regular, ongoing covert surveillance operation of university classes and university-recognized organizations, and is compiling police dossiers on 'matters which pertain to no illegal activity or
acts.' " [d.
157. [d. at 762.
158. [d. at 773.
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any claim of "first amendment privacy.mll9
D.

THE FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES IN THE
SURVEILLANCE CONTEXT

The Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education,160
stated that the government may not openly or secretly participate in church meetings and services. 161 The Everson opinion
not only discussed establishment clause concerns, but free exercise concerns as well, speaking at length on the "interrelation of
these complementary clauses".162
This characterization of the two first amendment religion
clauses as complementary raises not only the question of the relationship between the two clauses,168 but more specifically
whether an establishment clause analysis should be viewed as
valuable by a court considering a free exercise claim. To answer
159. White, 13 Cal.3d at 768 n.4. The court rejected the proposition that private
individuals, once they had revealed their associations or beliefs to other individuals, consequently lost their right to prevent the government from prying into those associations
or beliefs. [d.
160. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state statute providing for transportation of parochial school
students did not violate the first amendment).
161. [d. at 15-16. The Supreme Court in Euerson admonished courts that neither
the Federal or state governments may:
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance .... Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
[d.
162. Euerson, 330 U.S. at 13-16.
163. There are numerous cases that treat the two clauses together. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (Amish qualified for exemption from compulsory school attendance law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to claimant who refused to work on Saturday sabbath violates free
exercise clause, while exemption from eligibility provisions would not violate establishment clause); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164
(4th Cir. 1985) (woman's Title VII employment discrimination suit against church
barred because it would violate both religion clauses); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984) (accommodating school prayer club's right of
"religious speech" by allowing meetings during school hours would violate establishment
clause); Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979) (Puerto Rico's
subpoenaing church school documents violated both clauses); New Life Baptist Church
Academy v. East Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass. 1987) (statute requiring state
approval of private school curriculum violated both clauses).
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this question, it is necessary to examine how the Court has analyzed violations of these two clauses on other occasions.
In Lemon u. Kurtzman/ 64 the Supreme Court articulated
the traditional establishment clause test. 161i The test includes
three requirements: the challenged governmental practice must
have a secular legislative purpose; its primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and it must not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion. 166 The Court observed that
it was bound to apply strict scrutiny to prevent government intrusion into religious affairs. 167 Since the Lemon decision, the
Supreme Court has refined and elaborated upon the tests to be
employed. 168 In Larson u. Valente/ 59 the Court observed that
the establishment clause was added to the first amendment in
1791 in order to further safeguard the rights guaranteed by the
free exercise clause. 17o As the challenged governmental conduct
was alleged to create preferences between religions, such a preference had the effect of creating disapproval of one religion and
approval of another, which necessarily burdened free exercise
rights. Because the alleged violation of the establishment clause
necessarily affects free exercise rights, courts are required to apply the same strict scrutiny used in free exercise contexts. 171 The
Supreme Court thus requires courts to apply the same level of
scrutiny for a free exercise clause violation as for an establishment clause violation.
164. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (statutes concerning payments to parochial schools fostered
excessive entanglement with affairs of religious organizations).
165. [d. at 612-613.
166. [d.
167. [d. at 614.
168. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Nativity scene included in city-sponsored Christmas display not violative of establishment clause); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1981) (income reporting statute
creating denominational preferences violated establishment clause).
169. 456 U.S. 228 (1981).
170. Id. at 244-245. The Court observed further: "This constitutional prohibition of
denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the
Free Exercise Clause." [d. at 245. Continuing, the Court endorsed the view expressed by
James Madison that religious rights must have the same protection as other civil rights.
[d.

171. [d. at 246. The Court specifically held that when the challenged government
action creates a denominational preference, courts are directed to "apply strict scrutiny
in adjudging its constitutionality." Id. The Court explained that the action must be invalidated unless it is justified by "a compelling governmental interest [citation omitted) .
. . . [and is) closely fitted to further that interest." Id. at 247.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1990

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 7

118

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:97

IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit first found that the churches had standing to challenge the government's actions allegedly in violation
of their first amendment rights, relying primarily on the plaintiffs' allegations of actual injury caused by the agents' actions. l72
Notwithstanding those allegations of injury, the court dismissed
the claim for damages on the basis of qualified immunity.l73 The
court reasoned that it would not have been apparent to reasonable INS officials that undercover electronic surveillance of
church services without a warrant and without probable cause
violated the churches' clearly established rights under the first
amendment. m The court found "no support in the preexisting
case law for the churches' contention that the unlawfulness of
the conduct was apparent."l711
The court in Presbyterian Church took note of the Supreme
Court's statement in Everson v. Board of Education l76 forbidding the government from openly or secretly participating in the
affairs of religious organizations, but accorded little weight to
it,!77 As Everson involved state aid to parochial schools, the
court in Presbyterian Church found it to be "an establishment
clause case, not a free exercise case. IIl78 The court termed the
language "dicta", and found it inapplicable to the case at bar.179
The court disposed of the churches' fourth amendment
claim by rejecting the precedential value of the two cases relied
on by the plaintiffs, Katz v. United States l80 and Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily.l8.1 The court found that those cases did not establish the law regarding covert surveillance of churches. 182 The
172. The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520-21 (9th
Cir. 1989).
173. Id. at 528.
174. Id. at 527.
175. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527.
176. 330 U.S. at 16.
177. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527.
178. Id.
179. Id. The Supreme Court in Everson held that the challenged statute did not
violate the first amendment establishment clause. 330 U.S. at 18.
180. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless electronic surveillance of phone booth violated
man's fourth amendment rights).
181. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
182. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527.
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court reasoned that Katz may establish that the fourth amendment protects "reasonable expectations of privacy,"lS3 but that
the case had no bearing on the issue of whether such a reasonable expectation of privacy "attaches to church worship services
open to the public."ls.
The court distinguished Zurcher on factual grounds. lSI! The
plaintiffs cited Zurcher for the proposition that the fourth
amendment's requirements must be observed with "special
stringency" when a person's first amendment rights are implicated. ls6 They urged that when first amendment rights are implicated, the fourth amendment requires that a search be conducted with a warrant. lS7 The court in Presbyterian Church
conceded as much, but again relied on the Katz dictum authored
by concurring Justice Harlan. lss The court apparently reasoned
that since there was no expectation of privacy in church services
open to the public (as opposed to a private newspaper office not
generally open to the public), the question of whether the fourth
amendment's requirements were satisfied simply was not
relevant. ISS
Finally, the court noted that the finding of qualified immunity for the individual agents raised the questions of mootness
and standing to seek prospective relief. ISO The court reasoned
that, while the churches had standing to seek damages on the
first amendment issue, standing to seek prospective relief was
another question entirely. lSI The basis for the court's reasoning
was that a factual inquiry was necessary to determine the likeli183. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
184. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527.
185. [d. Although there was little elaboration, the court in Presbyterian Church
may have been referring to the fact that in Zurcher the police searched a private university newspaper office, with warrants based on probable cause that criminal evidence was
present. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565.
186. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527.
187. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 565, where the Court observed, "the prior cases do no
more than insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the search."
188. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan noted that prior
cases required that the complainant have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
that society recognizes as reasonable. [d.
189. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527.
190. [d. at 528.
191. [d. at 523, 528.
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hood that the churches would be subjected to the INS' covert
surveillance in the future.192 Accordingly, the court remanded
the case to the district court below for such a factual
determination. 19s
V. CRITIQUE
Had the court in Presbyterian Church (US.A.) v. United
States l94 conducted a broader survey of pre-existing caselaw, it
would have been better able to analyze the issue of qualified immunity of the defendant INS agents. Because there were no
cases precisely on point (i.e., concerning the covert surveillance
of churches by INS agents), the court essentially had two options. The first option, chosen by the court, consisted of finding
the defendants qualifiedly immune because the prior caselaw did
not expressly prohibit the covert surveillance of churches without a warrant or probable cause to suspect criminal activity. The
choice of this option effectively perpetuated immunity of INS
agents from suit in like situations. If other courts follow the precedent of this narrow interpretation of Harlow, this grant of
qualified immunity will be converted into perpetual immunity
because it operates to preclude a contrary holding. m
A second option would have been to broaden the court's
survey of first amendment caselaw. Had the court done this, a
more comprehensive examination of the relevant legal rules and
factual contexts could have been accomplished. Existing caselaw,
including both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court,
strongly indicates that in a situation such as that of Presbyterian Church, the plaintiffs' claims and the defendants' defenses
could not be properly evaluated on a motion for summary
judgment.
For at least the past five years, the Ninth Circuit has been
careful to scrupulously survey the state of the law whenever the
192. [d. at 528-29. The court noted that because the standing and mootness issues
had not been briefed by the parties, and because of the limited record on appeal, "we are
unable to assess the likelihood that the INS will again engage in the kind of church
surveillance challenged in this case." [d. at 529.
193. [d. at 529.
194. 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989).
195. See supra notes 88 and 100 and accompanying text.
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affirmative defense of qualified immunity is raised on a particular issue. 19o There are several areas in which a more comprehensive investigation might have led the court to conclude that the
government agents' qualified immunity defense should be rejected. As mandated by the Supreme Court in Anderson197 and
Forsyth,198 and by the Ninth Circuit in Ostrander1 99 and
Roth,200 the fact that the cases uncovered by such an investigation may lack the precise factual scenario present in Presbyterian Church should not entitle a defendant to an automatic
grant of qualified immunity. Both the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit have rejected strict factual similarity as a necessary requisite to a rejection of qualified immunity.20l

A.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT "LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS" TEST

The question of whether covert surveillance violates a person's first amendment rights is essentially the same whatever
the context: the purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether
the surveillance has had a "chilling effect" on a plaintiff's first
amendment rights. 202 Because of the essential similarity among
first amendment protections, reasonable INS agents should be
charged with knowledge of the law in other first amendment
contexts. For this reason, the court in Presbyterian Church
should have broadened the scope of its survey, to include a review of case law in the contexts of freedom of association, freedom of speech, and the right of privacy as it exists in the first
amendment.
Had the court conducted a broader review of first amendment case law, it would have become apparent that the appropriate inquiry into the INS agents' conduct should have focused
on whether their surveillance satisfied the "least restrictive
196. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
197. 483 U.S.635, 640 (1987).
198. 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985).
199. 851 F.2d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988).
200. 856 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1988).
201. Ostrander, 851 F.2d at 1217 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, and Forsyth,
432 U.S. at 535); see also Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408.
202. Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 1972). See also White v. Davis,
13 Cal. 3d 757, 771-72, 120 Cal.Rptr 94, 533 P.2d 222 (1975), for a discussion of federal
and state court holdings concerning a variety of first amendment contexts.
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means" component of first amendment analysis. 203 Putting this
conclusion into the context of a qualified immunity inquiry, the
court would then have asked whether, in light of the pre-existing
case law, a reasonable INS agent could have believed that his
warrantless and groundless surveillance of church worship services was even necessary (much less the "least restrictive
means") in an investigation which had already garnered more
than enough evidence to indict and convict the sanctuary
workers.
The holding in Callahan 20' should have alerted the court in
Presbyterian Church that as of 1984, the Ninth Circuit required
a strong factual showing of compelling interest and least restrictive means, in order for a government entity to intrude on first
amendment free exercise rights. Moreover, because the decision
pre-dated the events of Presbyterian Church, the court should
have charged the INS with constructive knowledge of the holding in Callahan.2Or>
In light of the above analysis, it is distinctly possible that
the court in Presbyterian Church erred in dismissing the damages claim against the individual INS agents. At the very least,
in view of the holding in Callahan, the claim should have been
allowed to proceed to trial on the merits to determine the factual question of whether the INS had a compelling need for that
particular type of surveillance, which could not be served by any
other less restrictive means.
This conclusion is supported by the reasoning in Roth,206
which recognized that the need for "particularized fact-specific
balancing" of first amendment rights against governmental interests did not require a grant of qualified immunity. In fact, the
opposite is true. Precisely because of the need for such a factual
inquiry, qualified immunity should not be granted on a motion
for summary judgment. 207 Moreover, the court in Presbyterian
203. Callahan, 736 F.2d at 1272-73.
204. [d.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70 and 84-86 for a discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's approval of holding defendant government officials constructively aware
of the judicial tests used to evaluate alleged constitutional violations.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103.
207. [d.
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Church could have found that the unnecessary surveillance constituted "egregious behavior" that would, as a "foregone conclusion", outweigh any benefit to the INS.208

B.

THE FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL

CONTEXT

The legal challenges in Presbyterian Church concerned the
relationship between the first and fourth amendments. The
question therefore arises whether the potential for a first amendment violation required the INS agents to comply with the requirements of the fourth amendment; i.e., whether they were required to obtain a warrant, or a warrant substitute, before
covertly invading the worship services of the church.
The Ninth Circuit in Presbyterian Church and Aguilar concluded that, based on the Supreme Court holdings in Katz and
Zurcher, the INS did not have to comply with the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 209 Because the analysis in
Aguilar was based on a factual situation in which the government was investigating suspected criminal activities, there seems
to be no basis upon which to argue with that court's holding that
surveillance of clandestine meetings held to discuss smuggling,
transporting and harboring of illegal aliens did not violate the
first amendment, even when the fourth amendment's strictest
criteria were not met.
But the holding in Presbyterian Church is not safe from attack. Because of the lack of probable cause to suspect criminal
activity in the worship services and Bible study classes, the "invited informer" rationale used by the court in Aguilar was not
available to the court in Presbyterian Church. 210 Moreover, the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine, as used in Katz
and its progeny, is similarly unavailable to the court in Presbyterian Church. This doctrine is an element of a criminal defense, but the court in Presbyterian Church invoked the doctrine as supportive of the government defendants' position in a
208. See Roth, 856 F.2d at 1408, citing Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 n. 18.
209. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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civil lawsuit.211 Taken to its logical limits, the court's position
would support covert governmental surveillance of all public
places, for whatever reasons, regardless of whether the government had probable cause to suspect criminal activity.212
It is difficult to comprehend th~ court's logic that INS
agents could justifiably rely on the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" doctrine espoused in Katz to avoid having to take cognizance of the clear holding in Zurcher.213 Absent an excuse for
ignoring the unequivocal holding in Zurcher that the implication
of first amendment rights mandates that government officials
comply with the fourth amendment warrant requirement, the
INS agents should have been charged with constructive knowledge of that requirement. By this reasoning, they were not entitled to a finding of qualified immunity from suit.
C.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES

The court's characterization of Everson as an establishment
clause case provided the court with a basis for not according any
weight to the "dicta" concerning the free exercise clause. 214 The
opinion does not indicate whether the court considered any
post-Everson cases concerning the relationship between the two
religion clauses. m Had the court conducted such a survey, it
could have reasonably concluded that judicial interpretations of
both clauses offer valuable guidance on the level of judicial scrutiny applied to challenged governmental actions that implicate
first amendment religious rights. 216
Although the tests for evaluating alleged violations for the
two religion clauses are stated in different terms, they each involve weighing a religious interest and a governmental interest
in the context of a challenged governmental action. On one
hand, there is the burden on the religious interest (whether an
"establishment" or an "exercise" of religion) caused by the challenged action. And on the other, there is the impediment to a
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 527, citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 516.
See White, 13 Ca1.3d at 766, for a discussion of cases on this point.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 176-79.
Id.
See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
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compelling governmental interest caused by suspending or modifying the challenged action. Both establishment and free exercise cases have required that the challenged governmental action
be closely fitted to the governmental interest.217
A survey of case law on the complementary relationship between the two religion clauses would have provided the court in
Presbyterian Church with a foundation upon which to find the
INS agents constructively aware of the traditional strict scrutiny
that courts apply to alleged violations of religious rights.218 This
long tradition of deference toward religious rights, coupled with
Everson's express warning that the government may not secretly
participate in the activities of churches,219 should have adequately put the INS agents on notice that their unnecessary surveillance of church services and classes violated the first amendment. Courts may split hairs over whether such an express
warning was "dicta", but in the context of a qualified immunity
analysis, a reasonable INS agent's understanding of that warning would not be affected by such fine judicial distinctions.

D.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY VERSUS "PERPETUAL" IMMUNITY

There are two troubling aspects of the court's finding of
qualified immunity for the defendants. The first concerns the
immediate parties to the lawsuit. Because the court was deciding
the question of immunity from suit, the court never reached the
merits of the first amendment damages claim. Not only were the
plaintiff churches effectively shut out of court on their damages
claim, but there was a strong indication that because of the
court's finding of qualified immunity, the lower court on remand
might find the case moot, or find that the churches no longer
217. Compare Larson, 228 U.S. at 247 (rules challenged as violative of establishment clause must be "closely fitted" to compelling governmental interest) with Callahan, 736 F.2d at 1274 (regulation challenged as violative of free exercise clause found
"essential" to achieve underlying governmental value) and American Baptist Church 1,
666 F. Supp. at 1366 (criminal harboring statute challenged as violative of free exercise
clause found to bear "close proximity and necessity" to compelling interest in control of
nation's borders).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 163-71 for a discussion of cases dealing
with the two religion' clauses. See also supra text accompanying notes 67-70 and 84-86
for a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's approval of holding defendant government officials
constructively aware of the tests used to evaluate alleged constitutional violations.
219. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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have standing to seek prospective relief.
The second troubling aspect of the holding in Presbyterian
Church concerns a broader policy question. The court's holding
is in effect a grant of perpetual immunity. There is little to stop
INS agents in the future from doing precisely the same sort of
thing, without fear of prosecution. Since there has apparently
never been a case holding INS agents liable for a damages claim
for covert surveillance of churches, the government agents can
continue to claim that they are unaware of the illegality of their
actions. This is precisely the sort of situation warned against in
Hobson. 22o
In view of the broad policy implications of the holding in
Presbyterian Church, it seems imperative to recall the purpose
of the qualified immunity doctrine as defined by the Supreme
Court in Harlow. Not only must a finding of qualified immunity
be based on a search for clearly established law, but it must also
be in keeping with the purpose of the doctrine.
In Harlow, the Supreme Court was concerned with protecting innocent public officials from insubstantial lawsuits. 221 The
situation in Presbyterian Church would appear to fall outside
the perimeters of that concern. The officials were hardly "innocent", since they were conducting surveillance that was demonstrably unnecessary. And the magnitude of the churches' alleged
injuries, as conceded by the court itself,m was certainly not "insubstantial" as that term was used in Harlow.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) v. United
States 228 should have rejected the INS agents' qualified immunity defense, and allowed the plaintiff churches' claim for mone220. 737 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (to require a prior Supreme Court case exactly
on point would "actually reward the Government for inventing and pursuing ever more
egregious conduct. Indeed, there never could be such a ruling from the Court, because
Harlow would always immunize the Government actors"). See also supra notes 88·92
and accompanying text.
221. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
222. Presbyterian Church, 870 F.2d at 523.
223. 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989).
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tary damages to remain in the case. Had the court conducted
the type of broad survey of prior caselaw mandated by other
Ninth Circuit opinions, it would have become apparent to the
court that the fundamental rights at issue in this case could not
be adequately protected at the summary judgment stage.
Neither the nature of the defendants' alleged misconduct,
nor the magnitude of the injuries alleged, fell within the purview
of the modern qualified immunity doctrine articulated by
Harlow. The plaintiff churches should have been allowed the opportunity to prove their claims at trial.
Michael E. Banister*

• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1991.
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